A LEGAL ANALYSIS TO CAUSES AND COMMANDS OF RESORT TO THE COURT FOR ELECTION OF JOINT STOCK COMPANIES’ TEMPORARY INSPECTOR

Abstract

Legal analysis to causes and commands of resort to court for election of joint stock companies’ temporary inspector or comparative explorative analysis of the legal questions on companies’ temporary inspection had not so far been approached by the specialists perhaps because of its extraordinary scientific complexity. This research shows that there are many differences between the law governing the directors’ board members and the executive manager on one side and the law governing the inspectors on the other side. Besides, there are considerable differences between the laws governing the main and temporary inspectors. These differences show that for the Legislature the inspection is more sensitive than management and considering the appointment of the temporary inspector by the court is a reason as well a consequence of this sensitivity. Seeing a company for a few months does not have a board of directors or an executive manager is comparatively easier tolerable for the Legislature than seeing it without having an inspector or sufficient number of inspectors. As well, decisions and operations of disqualified directors’ board’s members and disqualified executive managers are tolerable for the Legislature, whereas the reports of a disqualified inspector are never acceptable.