Obtaining a Potential Game Through Pricing, to Achieve Optimal Resource Management in Non-cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks
Abstract
Optimal resource management in a cognitive radio network has been studied using the game theory. Based on personal interests, users select their own desired utility function and compete for channel and power selection. This non-cooperative approach is controlled through an appropriate pricing method. We have shown that if the utility function in a cooperative potential game is used as the pricing function in a non-cooperative network, the game governing the non-cooperative network will also become potential and will thus converge to Nash equilibrium. The existence of selfish users will cause the network to be unstable, the one which has presumptively been designed with users’ cooperation. Besides, it decreases resource utilization gain. Using the recommended pricing has been shown to equilibrate the network. The equilibrium points also enjoy some optimality criteria such as Pareto optimality. By conducting simulations and studying parameters like sum-rate of network and its total interference, it is shown that resource utilization will also approaches to optimal states. © 2015, Springer Science+Business Media New York.