The Relationship between Metaphysics and Normative Sciences according to al-Farabi and Hilary Putnam

Abstract

<strong>In their exploration of normative sciences (such as practical wisdom and jurisprudence in traditional sciences and ethics and economics in modern sciences), both al-Farabi and Hilary Putnam find destructive or generative influences of metaphysics to be obvious. They both believe that neglecting these roles that metaphysics plays will lead to irreparable effects. According to al-Farabi, metaphysics plays an indispensable role in how the normative disciplines use knowledge; thus, for al-Farabi, excluding metaphysics implies the exclusion of the foundations of some disciplines, the rejection of objectivity in values, and falling into relativism. In contrast, Putnam rejects traditional metaphysics and seeks to remove it from normative sciences. Thus, he introduces an alternative for the role that traditional metaphysics plays in normative sciences. This alternative is her specific narrative that he offers from pragmatist philosophy. In this narrative, Putnam considers pragmatism a kind of metaphysics without borders that criticizes and reforms other philosophies. In this new perspective, Putnam presents another picture of normative sciences as well as a criterion for objectivity and relativism. This research benefits from logical-philosophical analysis, including content, statement, and system analysis through a comparative approach to the ideas of these two philosophers.</strong>