Stealthy FDI attack to maximize load shedding considering voltage sensitivity analysis

Abstract

Today, the expansion utilization of telecommunication systems results in the power systems having a physical-cyber structure. Despite the advantages of this structure, one of the main challenges is the impact of cyber on physical and vice versa. This study focuses on False Data Injection (FDI) attacks, where the attacker's aim is to overload a transmission line, leading to load shedding. It is proven that the attacker can bypass Bad Data Detection (BDD) module in DC state estimation (DC-SE) by considering both voltage phase angle and magnitude, even when they only know network parameters and can only inject false data in local area. The proposed method is formulated as a bi-level max-min optimization problem where the load shedding is maximized and minimized from the attacker's and operator's perspectives, respectively. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method, simulations are carried out on IEEE 39 Bus New England System using DIgSILENT PowerFactory 2021 SP2. © 2024 Elsevier B.V.