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Publication Date: 2023
Acta Analytica (03535150)38(4)pp. 575-584
Much of the recent literature on the normativity of belief has focused on undermining or defending narrow scope readings of doxastic norms. Wide scope readings are largely assumed to have been decisively refuted. This paper will oppose this trend by defending a wide scope reading of the norm of belief. We shall argue for the modest claim that if it is plausible to regard belief as constitutively normative (in the minimal sense that false belief is eo ipso defective), then a modified version of the wide scope reading of the norm of belief should be preferred to the narrow scope reading. (This is subject to certain attractive conditions relating to the holism involved in the fixation and confirmation of belief.) © 2023, Springer Nature B.V.
Publication Date: 2017
European Journal of Philosophy (09668373)25(4)pp. 1327-1339
According to many philosophers, the notion of belief is constitutively normative (Boghossian (,); Shah (,); Shah and Velleman (); Gibbard (); Wedgwood (,)). In a series of widely discussed papers (,), Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have developed an ingenious ‘Moral Twin Earth’ argument against ‘Cornell Realist’ metaethical views which hold that moral terms have synthetic natural definitions in the manner of natural kind terms. In this paper we shall suggest that an adaptation of the Moral Twin Earth argument to the doxastic case – Doxastic Twin Earth – provides new evidence for the normativity of belief. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Publication Date: 2013
Analysis (14678284)73(3)pp. 419-422
