تاریخ انتشار: ۲۰۱۵/۱۱/۲۲
پژوهشهای فلسفی کلامی (17359791)(1)pp. 111-130
خواب و رؤیا، معنا و جایگاه آن در فلسفه بحثی است که کمتر فیلسوف برجسته ای از آن غافل مانده و به بررسی آن از منظر اصول و مبانی فلسفی خود نپرداخته باشد. در نظر حکمای اسلامی، رؤیا حاصل فاصله گرفتن روح از حواس ظاهری و میل آن به قوای باطنی است، به این معنی که انسان گاهی در عالم خواب به ادراک حقایق هستی و وقایع آینده موفق می شود و از این رهگذر، به ادراک و معرفت شهودی دست می یابد؛ این احوال اگر در عالم خواب طبیعی پیش آید، در صورتی که شفاف باشد، «رؤیای صادقه» است و در صورتی که ضعیف و مبهم باشد، پیام آن باید با تفسیر و تجزیه و تحلیل (تعبیر)، روشن شود.از دیدگاه ابن سینا، در حالت خواب، قوه متخیله به عالم قدس متصل می شود و از طریق حس مشترک به کشف و الهام نائل می گردد. ملاصدرا نیز همین نظر را دارد ولی قائل به این است که شخص برای متّحد شدن با عقل فعال باید به مقام و مرتبه جامعیت در نشآت سه گانه عقلی، نفسی و حسی رسیده باشد. پرسش هایی چون ،ماهیت خواب چیست؟ آیا خوابها احتیاج به تعبیر دارند؟؛واگر پاسخ به آن مثبت است آیا همه خواب ها باید تعبیر شوند یا پاره ای از آنها ؟ آیا بین تعبیر و تأویل تفاوت است؟و ... سوالاتی هستند که برای هر صاحب عقل سلیمی ممکن است مطرح شوند؛اینک ما در این مقاله برآنیم تاتحلیل این مسائل را ازمنظر دوفیلسوف ابن سینا و ملاصدرا به تماشا گزاریم.
تاریخ انتشار: ۲۰۲۲/۰۴/۲۱
پژوهش های فلسفی (22517960)16(38)pp. 362-388
با وجود این که اندیشه باختین و هگل در نظر اول ارتباط چندان روشنی با یکدیگر ندارند و به خصوص که باختین در اظهارنظرهای صریح خود منتقد هگل و روش دیالکتیکی اوست، اما میتوان بر اساس اصول خود باختین خوانشی بینامتنی از متون باختین داشت و دیالوگیسم او را که در حکم چهارچوب اندیشه اوست بر اساس دیالکتیک هگل خوانش کرد. این خوانش بینامتنی از سه بخش تشکیل شده: در بخش نخست وضعیتهای دیالکتیکی که عبارتاند از «وضعیت در – خود»، «وضعیت برای – خود» و «وضعیت در – خود و برای – خود»، در دیالوگیسم باختین شناسایی میشوند. بخش دوم به بازبینی دیالوگیسم باختین با کمک مفاهیم منطقی «کل، جزء و فرد» از فلسفه هگل، اختصاص داده شده است. در بخش سوم نیز ادعای باختین مبنی بر مونولوگی بودن دیالکتیک هگل بررسی و رد میشود. در نتیجه این خوانش بینامتنی از دیالوگیسم باختین هر چند گفتوگوی پنهان او با هگل آشکار میشود اما این گفتوگو هنوز به معنای تطابق صددرصدی اندیشه او با هگل نیست.
تاریخ انتشار: ۲۰۱۳/۰۳/۱۸
اندیشه دینی (22516123)(30)pp. 125-136
Publication Date: 2024
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research (17359791)26(2)pp. 79-100
Proposing the theory of influx, Francisco Suárez argued that each of the four causes “inflows” its being into the effect. This theory takes the concept of four causes, especially the final cause, to be similar to the efficient cause. By this move, Suárez can account for God’s purposeless and free will as well as His purposeful action through nature. Influenced by Suárez’s theory, Descartes excluded the final cause from his philosophy, which paved the way for the mechanical explanation of nature. It was thus possible for a theory developed with theological objectives to provide the basis for the scientific explanation of nature. In this study, we examine the differences and similarities between Descartes’s and Suárez’s natural teleology. Comparing these two metaphysical systems reveals how two theories may be influenced by the same principles but produce contradictory results. Thus, we will first analyze the concept of the theory of influx. Following that, we present textual evidence to highlight the impact of influx theory on Descartes and Suárez’s natural teleology. Subsequently, we examine how Descartes took causal (viz. efficient) necessity as the only good in nature by developing Suárez’s theory of causality. © 2024 University of Qom. All rights reserved.
Publication Date: 2014
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences (discontinued) (20392117)5(23)pp. 1949-1955
This paper tries to demonstrate how Jacques Derrida deconstructs Hegel's philosophy through detecting an abyss at the hub of the Hegelian system. Derrida's work on Hegel, Glas, which is concerned with Hegel's philosophy, highlights the remarkable resemblance between Hegel's dialectic and Freud's psychoanalysis. Derrida's argument draws a comparison between the Hegelian concept of Aufhebung and Freud's repression. This comparative study aims at showing that no systematic thinking or analysis can release itself from an indigestible and paradoxical element that constitutes the abyss of the systematic or analytical thinking. The first part of the article shows how Derrida, inspired by Kant, thinks of the abyss of the system as the quasi-transcendental that, in a paradoxical way, makes philosophical system both possible and impossible. Concentrating on the concept of repression, the second part delineates similarities of the dialectic and psychoanalysis. In Hegel's view, there is nothing out of cognition; however, Hegel's obsession with Antigone's tragedy reveals that there are dark sides remained outside of the Hegelian system. The last section deals with these remains in Hegel's account of Antigone. Such abyssal points assert that there is a sort of resistance to psychoanalysis, or the process of analysis in general, which deconstruction has always attempted to make us more sensitive to it. © 2014, Mediterranean Center of Social and Educational Research. All rights reserved.
Publication Date: 2023
Journal of Philosophical Investigations (22517960)17(43)pp. 695-714
In discussing Hume's view of causality, it has been generally focused on its negative aspects and skeptical results. Whereas, according to naturalistic interpretation, Hume's purpose is to illustrate the nature of human beings and to determine the limits of human understanding. Hume's aim is not to philosophically reject the belief in causally connected, but rather to criticize the sort of philosophical thinking that claim to rationalize them. In this paper, the author intends to provide first the naturalistic explanation of Hume’s causality discussion, relying on Kemp Smith's unprecedented interpretation. In explanation kemp smith provided for the functioning of human mind, the origin of the necessary connection idea is an inner feeling that is generalized to reality, and the belief in causality cannot be proved by any argument. The emotional origin of belief in causality, which is not based on reason, is a serious challenge in its acceptance and justification. Therfore the second and main purpose of this article is to examine the mental origin of the necessary connection, then the concept of reason is evaluated from Hume's view to clarify in what sense belief in causality cannot be based on reason. © The Author(s).
Publication Date: 2023
Journal of Philosophical Investigations (22517960)16(41)pp. 257-270
The deepest and most rooted form of racism can be found in the Bible which claims the superiority of a race as God's demand or divine destination. But this idea survived in modern philosophy by appeal to the different methods. In this paper I will introduce methods of justifying racism, most of which are in the philosophical context. Legal racism claims that some races have not enough reason to be members of civil society and enjoy their rights. Racism in its historical method, claims that the history of thought has shown that some races play a major role in the production of thought and this is a result of their superiority. In philosophical method, it is argued that some of the human capabilities in some species have not been activated and finally in scientific method, it is claimed that the superiority of one race in the struggle for survival is a scientific achievement of the scientific laws such as Evolution hypothesis. © The Author(s).
Publication Date: 2022
Journal of Philosophical Investigations (22517960)16(40)pp. 597-612
This article returns to the longstanding problem of the soul/body relation. However, highlighting Orphism's impact on Plato, instead of arguing for a new account of this relation, the current study tries to trace back the problem to Orphism. Reading Plato’s work, while keeping in mind the Orphic rituals and beliefs concerned with immortality, would shed new light on the rise of the notion of the soul. Accordingly, some Orphean teachings and mythological origins will be reviewed. Then it will be focused on some of Plato's dialogues, which had a profound effect on later soul studies, to demonstrate how they are formulated based on Orphean themes. © The Author(s).
Publication Date: 2022
Journal of Philosophical Investigations (22517960)16(38)pp. 869-894
The issue of necessity is one of the most important aspects of Hegel's philosophy. The meaning of necessity per se or necessity alone is not discussed here, but here we consider only the two constraints used in Hegel's expressions for necessity. The subject of discussion, accordingly, is the two words used in Hegel's statements, namely external and internal necessity. In the first stage, this article deals with the external and internal necessity. In the second stage, it explains the relationship between the two. Then in the third stage we discuss the relationship between these two types of necessity and Hegel's science or philosophical system, and finally in the fourth step, an attempt is made to critique and evaluate this relationship. © 2022, University of Tabriz. All rights reserved.
Publication Date: 2021
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research (17359791)23(1)pp. 149-172
The Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (1809) is the most coherent form of Schelling’s attempt to describe the absolute system or the system of freedom. For the first time in the twentieth century, with Heidegger's careful reference to his treatise on freedom and his repeated commentary in 1936 and 1941, the importance of this treatise in the history of Western thought became apparent. Heidegger focuses on Schilling’s thinking, especially with Schilling’s treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, research into the formation of the system, and the question of the possibility of a system of freedom as a question of the essence of being. Schilling bases his research on the system of freedom on a correct ontological basis in order to transcend formal freedom as an independent determinant of mechanical causation and to achieve the true definition of freedom as the ability to do good and evil. And after proposing the inadequacy of formal freedom in the idealist systems before it, it introduces the real and living concept of freedom as the ability to do good and evil. Heidegger demonstrates the independence of the Schelling system in comparison with the Fichte and Hegel systems, and his innovations in response to issues such as evil, freedom, identity, and the relation of being and “is” are most evident in the metaphysical realm of the will; however, remaining within the metaphorical framework also prevents Schilling from approaching the question of the truth of existence. Schilling’s important issue is the elimination of the opposition between freedom and necessity, which, in his view, is the focus of philosophy. For this reason, the discussion of freedom is at the heart of the system in its true sense, and in his opinion, his dissertation is for the first time the design of a system based on the idea of human freedom. The possibility of a system of freedom must be created in accordance with the principle of identity, which does not ignore the meaning of the relation of theology. In Schelling’s Heideggerian interpretation of the principle of identity, the priority of ontological issues in matters of theological nature such as all theism is given more importance and the question of all theism as a question of the system to the question of “is” and how to connect the structure of beings as a whole. The purpose of this paper is to analyze Heidegger’s interpretation of the concept of the system of freedom according to Schelling with emphasis on the ontological distinction between ground and existence. This study seeks to answer these two questions: how does the design of the real concept of freedom open the way to explain the ontological foundation of the possibility of evil and the possibility of freedom in the system? Also, how does the distinction between ground and existence lead to Schelling's main goal in resolving the conflict between system and freedom? Moreover, according to Heidegger, to what extent does this distinction arise from Schilling’s metaphysical and subject-centered thinking? Copyright © the authors.
Publication Date: 2024
Artificial Intelligence and Law (09248463)32(2)pp. 325-367
We combine linear temporal logic (with both past and future modalities) with a deontic version of justification logic to provide a framework for reasoning about time and epistemic and normative reasons. In addition to temporal modalities, the resulting logic contains two kinds of justification assertions: epistemic justification assertions and deontic justification assertions. The former presents justification for the agent’s knowledge and the latter gives reasons for why a proposition is obligatory. We present two kinds of semantics for the logic: one based on Fitting models and the other based on neighborhood models. The use of neighborhood semantics enables us to define the dual of deontic justification assertions properly, which corresponds to a notion of permission in deontic logic. We then establish the soundness and completeness of an axiom system of the logic with respect to these semantics. Further, we formalize the Protagoras versus Euathlus paradox in this logic and present a precise analysis of the paradox, and also briefly discuss Leibniz’s solution. © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2023.
Faroldi, F.L.G.,
Ghari, M.,
Lehmann, E.,
Studer, T. Publication Date: 2024
Journal of Logic and Computation (0955792X)34(4)pp. 640-664
Different notions of the consistency of obligations collapse in standard deontic logic. In justification logics, which feature explicit reasons for obligations, the situation is different. Their strength depends on a constant specification and on the available set of operations for combining different reasons. We present different consistency principles in justification logic and compare their logical strength. We propose a novel semantics for which justification logics with the explicit version of axiom D,, are complete for arbitrary constant specifications. Consistency is sometimes formulated in terms of permission. We therefore study permission in the context of justification logic, introducing a notion of free-choice permission for the first time. We then discuss the philosophical implications with regard to some deontic paradoxes. © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
Publication Date: 2024
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (00294527)65(1)pp. 81-112
We present tableau proof systems for the annotated version of propositional justification logics, that is, justification logics which are formulated using annotated application operators. We show that the tableau systems are sound and complete with respect to Mkrtychev models, and some tableau systems are analytic and provide a decision procedure for the annotated justification logics. We further show Craig's interpolation property and Beth's definability theorem for some annotated justification logics. © 2024 by University of Notre Dame.
Publication Date: 2023
Studia Logica (15728730)111(4)pp. 573-613
We present algebraic semantics for the classical logic of proofs based on Boolean algebras. We also extend the language of the logic of proofs in order to have a Boolean structure on proof terms and equality predicate on terms. Moreover, the completeness theorem and certain generalizations of Stone’s representation theorem are obtained for all proposed algebras. © 2023, Springer Nature B.V.
Publication Date: 2023
Logic Journal of the IGPL (13689894)31(1)pp. 1-38
Temporal justification logic is a new family of temporal logics of knowledge in which the knowledge of agents is modelled using a justification logic. In this paper, we present various temporal justification logics involving both past and future time modalities. We combine Artemov's logic of proofs with linear temporal logic with past, and we also investigate several principles describing the interaction of justification and time. We present two kinds of semantics for our temporal justification logics, one based on interpreted systems and Fitting models and the other based on Mkrtychev models, and further, we establish soundness and completeness. We show that the internalization property holds in some of the temporal justification logics. We further investigate the two well-known epistemic-temporal notions of no forgetting and no learning in the framework of justification logics. Finally, we present temporal justification logics that avoid the logical omniscience problem. © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
Publication Date: 2017
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, EPTCS (20752180)243pp. 59-74
Justification logics are modal-like logics with the additional capability of recording the reason, or justification, for modalities in syntactic structures, called justification terms. Justification logics can be seen as explicit counterparts to modal logics. The behavior and interaction of agents in distributed system is often modeled using logics of knowledge and time. In this paper, we sketch some preliminary ideas on how the modal knowledge part of such logics of knowledge and time could be replaced with an appropriate justification logic. © S. Bucheli, M. Ghari & T. Studer.
Publication Date: 2017
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic (01680072)168(1)pp. 72-111
Justification logics are modal-like logics that provide a framework for reasoning about justifications. This paper introduces labeled sequent calculi for justification logics, as well as for combined modal-justification logics. Using a method due to Sara Negri, we internalize the Kripke-style semantics of justification and modal-justification logics, known as Fitting models, within the syntax of the sequent calculus to produce labeled sequent calculi. We show that all rules of these systems are invertible and the structural rules (weakening and contraction) and the cut rule are admissible. Soundness and completeness are established as well. The analyticity for some of our labeled sequent calculi are shown by proving that they enjoy the subformula, sublabel and subterm properties. We also present an analytic labeled sequent calculus for S4LPN based on Artemov–Fitting models. © 2016 Elsevier B.V.
Publication Date: 2016
Logic Journal of the IGPL (13689894)24(5)pp. 743-773
Justification logies provide a framework for reasoning about justifications and evidence. In this article, we study a fuzzy variant of justification logics in which an agent's justification for a belief has certainty degree between 0 and 1. We replace the classical base of justification logics with Hájek's rational Pavelka logic. We introduce fuzzy possible world semantics with crisp accessibility relation and also single world models for our logics. We establish soundness and graded-style completeness for both kinds of semantics. We also introduce extensions with product conjunction. Finally, we offer a solution to a variant of the sorites paradox in our fuzzy justification logics. © The Author 2016.
Publication Date: 2014
Theory of Computing Systems (14330490)55(1)pp. 1-40
Justification logics are a family of modal epistemic logics which enables us to reasoning about justifications and evidences. In this paper, we introduce evidence-based multi-agent distributed knowledge logics, called distributed knowledge justification logics. The language of our justification logics contain evidence-based knowledge operators for individual agents and for distributed knowledge, which are interpreted respectively as "t is a justification that agent i accepts for F", and "t is a justification that all agents accept for F if they combine their knowledge and justifications". We study basic properties of our logics and prove the conservativity of distributed knowledge justification logics over multi-agent justification logics. We present Kripke style models, pseudo-Fitting and Fitting models, as well as Mkrtychev models (single world Fitting models) and prove soundness and completeness theorems. We also find a class of Fitting models which satisfies the principle of full communication. Finally, we establish the realization theorem, which states that distributed knowledge justification logics can be embedded into the modal distributed knowledge logics, and vise versa. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
Publication Date: 2012
Journal of Logic and Computation (0955792X)22(5)pp. 1171-1198
Epistemic logics with justification, S4LP and S4LPN, are combinations of the modal epistemic logic S4 and the Logic of Proofs LP, with some connecting principles. These logics together with the modal knowledge operator □F (F is known), contain infinitely many operators of the form t: F (t is a justification for F), where t is a term. Regarding the Realization Theorem of S4, LP is the justification counterpart of S4, in the sense that, every theorem of S4 can be transformed into a theorem of LP (by replacing all occurrences of by suitable terms), and vise versa. In this article, we first introduce a new cut-free sequent calculus LPLG for LP, and then extend it to obtain a cut-free sequent calculus for S4LP and a cut-free hypersequent calculus for S4LPN. All cut elimination theorems are proved syntactically. Moreover, these sequent systems enjoy a weak subformula property. Then, we show that theorems of S4LP can be realized in LP and theorems of S4LPN can be realized in JS5 (the justification counterpart of modal logic S5). Consequently, we prove that S4LP and S4LPN are conservative extensions of LP. © 2011 The Author. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
Publication Date: 2012
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (03029743)7415pp. 91-108
In this paper, we introduce justification counterparts of distributed knowledge logics. Our justification logics include explicit knowledge operators of the form [[t]] iF and , which are interpreted respectively as "t is a justification that agent i accepts for F", and "t is a justification that all agents implicitly accept for F". We present Kripke style models and prove the completeness theorem. Finally, we give a semantical proof of the realization theorem. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
Publication Date: 2025
Journal of Philosophical Investigations (22517960)19(50)pp. 261-282
Unity of intelligent and intelligible has its supreme formation in philosophy of Mulla-Sadra. But this fact according to many philosophical texts is rooted in the philosophy of ancient Greek. For instance, it is recognizable in Plato, Aristotle and even Parmenides. Plotinus’s Enneads are ample of arguments about union of intelligent and intelligible and explanations and applications of this important philosophical principle. This essay tries to trace this principle in Plato by investigating his own texts. Of course, this is not going to be a kind of imposing Sadra’s philosophical views on Plato but rather to unveil common fundamental weltanschauungs and to show innate correlations and beyond-historical kinship of this philosophies. This essay tries to achieve this kinship in Plato by reconstructing his arguments for union of intelligent and intelligible and by this means contributes to study the historical development of this idea. To accept or deny the union of intelligent and intelligible makes important and meaningful divergences on reading and understanding Plato. The conclusions of Unity of intelligent and intelligible in interpreting plato’s Doctrines are discussing at the end with some instances. © The Author(s).
Publication Date: 2022
Journal of Philosophical Investigations (22517960)16(39)pp. 453-465
At the beginning of the fourth book of metaphysics, Aristotle speaks of knowledge as "existing as existing and its inherent effects" and in other places he refers to this book as "the first philosophy" or "the first philosophy", "wisdom" and "theology". Which is later called metaphysics. As he has given different names to this science, he has also raised various topics for this science. The most fundamental subject in metaphysics of Aristotle is existence. In metaphysic, Aristotle has expressed the knowledge of existent in different ways and it is displayed various matter on this scale in a proper position. In the beginning of forth book of metaphysics, it is said that metaphysics is a knowledge of being as such, but metaphysics is a divine science in other parts so that its subject is an immovable and spiritual being. Also, it is a science to discuss the highest principle and elements and it is described as the knowledge of substance or primary substance too. So, the commentators of Aristotle encountered with some contradictions to identify the exact subject of metaphysics from the earlier of time. © The Author(s).
Publication Date: 2023
Acta Analytica (03535150)38(4)pp. 575-584
Much of the recent literature on the normativity of belief has focused on undermining or defending narrow scope readings of doxastic norms. Wide scope readings are largely assumed to have been decisively refuted. This paper will oppose this trend by defending a wide scope reading of the norm of belief. We shall argue for the modest claim that if it is plausible to regard belief as constitutively normative (in the minimal sense that false belief is eo ipso defective), then a modified version of the wide scope reading of the norm of belief should be preferred to the narrow scope reading. (This is subject to certain attractive conditions relating to the holism involved in the fixation and confirmation of belief.) © 2023, Springer Nature B.V.
Publication Date: 2017
European Journal of Philosophy (09668373)25(4)pp. 1327-1339
According to many philosophers, the notion of belief is constitutively normative (Boghossian (,); Shah (,); Shah and Velleman (); Gibbard (); Wedgwood (,)). In a series of widely discussed papers (,), Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have developed an ingenious ‘Moral Twin Earth’ argument against ‘Cornell Realist’ metaethical views which hold that moral terms have synthetic natural definitions in the manner of natural kind terms. In this paper we shall suggest that an adaptation of the Moral Twin Earth argument to the doxastic case – Doxastic Twin Earth – provides new evidence for the normativity of belief. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Publication Date: 2013
Analysis (14678284)73(3)pp. 419-422
