Journal of Philosophical Theological Research (17359791)(مقالات آماده انتشار)
In recent scholarly discourse, natural theology’s forefront initiative has been the construction of theistic arguments grounded in empirical observations. A notable focus within this domain is the cumulative argument (CA) approach. The CA posits that individually modest arguments, when synergized, can forge a more compelling collective case. This approach bifurcates into deductive and non-deductive methodologies, both scrutinized through a descriptive-analytical lens across three evaluative tiers: 1. Merits: The CA challenges atheistic and agnostic skepticism, bolstering theistic convictions. 2. Solvable Critiques: The CA process is complex and challenging for the general public, it overlooks competing hypotheses, and a mere 50% likelihood assigned to premises fails to substantiate conclusive acceptance. 3. Critiques: The CA blurs distinctions between belief accuracy probability and rationality degree; it also grapples with assigning definitive values to probability multipliers. This paper culminates with an exploration of the CA’s implementation within Islamic intellectual traditions, illustrating its application in affirming divine existence and underpinning methodologies like suspicious density and prophetic veracity, ultimately aiming to convince counterparts through reasoned dialogue. Although it has some limitations, CA is both rational and defensible when it effectively reinforces core theoretical beliefs and religious practices, including worship and ethics.
Based on naturalism in the discussion of evolution, human cognitive faculties have been produced through natural selection, genetic mutation and other blind stages of random mutation of genes, and the ultimate goal of these powers is survival and reproduction (adaptation). Therefore, these faculties do not seek to produce correct beliefs, but their main task is to adapt the living organism to the surrounding environment and thus survive. One of the most significant criticisms of atheistic naturalism is the Bayesian evolutionary argument (BEA). The model of BEA against naturalism is taken from Bayes’ theorem. Despite some strengths of BEA in the criticism of naturalism, since BEA does not pay attention to some requirements of Bayes' theorem, it needs reflection and completion: First, this argument does not pay attention to assigning any particular value. Second, the reliability of cognitive faculties sometimes requires suspension. Third, the reliability of beliefs is classified in different types. Fourth, the Bayesian argument ignores other evidence related to the reliability of cognitive faculties. Fifth, the result “probability of the reliability of cognitive faculties is 1” is a false result according to Bayes' verification theory. Sixth, independent evidence may temporarily rescue naturalism and evolution from self-defeating, but self-defeating naturalism can be proven through other arguments, and therefore self-defeating is still valid. This paper has two goals: I. analysis of BEA in rejection of naturalism. II. provide additions and suggestions to completing it.
In 1948 a legendary debate occurred at the Oxford Socratic Club between C. S. Lewis and Elizabeth Anscombe. In this meeting, Lewis shows that atheistic naturalism is refute in meaning the strict materialism. Anscombe makes three basic criticisms against Lewis' argument:1. Lack of distinction between irrational and non-rrational causes of belief,2. The threat of skepticism,3. Lack of distinction between types of “full” explanations. Lewis and Anscombe's views can be considered in several ways: 1. Despite Anscombe's correct critique, the lack of distinction between irrational and non-rational causes does not solve the problem of naturalism which is an inference belief of other beliefs. 2. Anscombe considers that “if naturalism is correct, there is no valid human argument”, is a skeptical threat to knowledge, while this objection does not problem on Lewis' argument. 3. Contrary to Anscombe's claim, the ommisive approach to other explanations is not a consequence of Lewis's Argument, but the main idea of naturalism itself. 4. Lewis's incorrect analysis of mental states is accidental because he considers the origin of these states to be non-physical. 5. Lewis did not explain well what he meant by “did not explain well what he meant by "the impossibility of evolutionary processes in creating creatures with perception and understanding of creatures without understanding”. By an analytical, comparative and critical insightcan eliminate, correct and reconstruct the weaknesses of Anscombe and Lewis' views.
In the naturalism and evolutionism context, the ultimate objective and function of cognitive faculties is adaptation, survival and reproduction. Our cognitive faculties are not developed to generate true beliefs, therefore, but to have adapt behavior. Alvin Planatinga is not at ease with naturalism idea. To him, the problem with naturalism is the non-existence of proper understanding on the manner by which the belief and behavior are interrelated, thus, he concludes that the reliability of cognitive faculties are founded on low naturalistic evolutionism; because any alleged argument against these faculties, first, requires reliable perceptual faculties and next, if we realize lack of reliability in these faculties we developed self-defeating belief, consequently, in both the cases naturalism face criticism. Plantiga’s criticism on naturalism view as to reliability of cognitive faculties has made some philosophers encounter problems like: 1) high probability of interrelating casual belief and behavior, 2) argument based on personal incredulity, 3) lack of distinction between reflective and non-reflective knowledge, 4) finding independent evidence for reliability as to escape self-defeating, 5) the external status of mental states and 6) the problem of circle. To the authors here, except the problem of circle, Plantiga has been able to find proper answer for the rest of five problems. The objective here is to analyze, complete, expand and criticize Plantiga’s notion in rejecting the atheistic naturalism through the ability to secure cognitive faculties to unveil consistency of the new scientific findings with religious beliefs.
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research (17359791)(3)pp. 5-22
Ambiguous Quranic verses have been one of the challenging issues during the history of Islamic sciences. In the principles of his ontology, Mulla Sadra Shirazi (the Leader of Theosophers) believes in particular monotheism versus general monotheism. He holds that, on the basis of philosophical-mystical principles of particular monotheism view, outward meanings of Quranic verses can be maintained and all ambiguous verses can predicated to their outwards meanings, without the necessity of expounding the esoteric meanings of verses or of belief in corporealization about the essence of God. On the contrary, ambiguous verses cannot be predicated on their outward meanings on the basis of general monotheism; rather, their esoteric meanings should be expounded and the belief in corporealization about the Necessary Being should accepted. Given the fact that ambiguous Quranic verses are multi-factorial, Mulla Sadra adopts an inter-disciplinary approach to this issue
The present article intends to show a reasonable and documentary analysis of two important logical classifications: classification of quantified proposition into factual and external and classification of positive predicative proposition into factual, external and mental. The overlap of these two classifications which was happened because of the participation of the term, created many problems and ambiguities in understanding of the predecessors’ knowledge of sciences. The present article is an attempt to study these two classifications with a logical and epistemological approach. Our attitude in this article is a historical one. We first, analyze the bipartite classification then explain two reports of the triadic classification. In the shade of logical analysis and historical explanation the weaknesses and strengths of these classifications would become clear. Also we survey the opposing viewpoint in this problem.
Qurbani, H., Ebadi, A., Amousoltani foroushani, M.M.
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research (17359791)(4)pp. 135-150
Muslim theologians have presented a full description of the multiplicity of God's existence proofs and the ways of His rational knowledge in the Islamic tradition. They also explained the secret of this plurality in different ways as follows: 1. the plurality of ways is based on the plurality of wayfarer's talents; 2. the plurality of ways is based on cognitive powers of wayfarers; 3. The plurality of ways is the result of the various concepts abstracted from the essence of God; 4. The plurality of ways is based on the plurality of Divine Names and Attributes. The first and the second explanations are subjective explanations seeking the secret of plurality in the side of knower but the third and forth ones are objectives. Exploring them deeply, this paper shows that, individually observed, each one of these ways is involved in an impermissible reductionism and the fallacy of one-sided assessment. So a comprehensive approach, i.e. a combination of both subjective and objective ways, is the only accurate approach in this regard. Therefore these four explanations are collectively the secret of plurality of ways of proving and knowing God.
Khamineh Y., Ghiasvand M., Panahi-Alanagh S., Rastegarmand P., Zolghadri S., Stanek A., Rismanchian, M., Ebadi, A., Khodaeian, N., Amoosoltani, M., Bahramian, L., Fathi, M.
