The internalism/externalism controversy has various expanding features in contemporary epistemology. In this article we try to show capabilities of philosophy of Sadra for interfering in this debate. The main goal is to rely on principles of Sadra and defend a kind of internalism that consider cognitive access to factors needed for a belief to be epistemically justified as a pivotal condition. It will be proved that for defense of any knowledge, we should accept immediate and direct knowledge to states of mind and this knowledge is superior from threefold propositional knowledge and merely with reliance on division knowledge to present knowledge and propositional knowledge internalism is defensible. Indeed, some ambiguities in internalism/ externalism controversy is due to inattention properties of present knowledge and its separation from propositional knowledge. After that as respects to those properties and also reliance on division knowledge to simple and compound we answer three main difficulties internalism face and display solution for internalist´s contra examples.
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research (17359791)(4)pp. 7-22
Conjecture, refutation, priority of theory to observation, verisimilitude and
realism are the principal elements of refutability approach. Restating these
elements, this paper is going to show some of its internal inconsistencies and
argue that if observation wouldn’t play a positive role in making theory, there
is no guarantee for verisimilitude to be achieved. Besides, it makes clear that
some statements of priority of theory to observation are inconsistent with
realism. And finally, it will be stated that the Popperian approach involves a
kind of deep skepticism.
