Publication Date: 2014
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences (discontinued) (20392117)5(23)pp. 1949-1955
This paper tries to demonstrate how Jacques Derrida deconstructs Hegel's philosophy through detecting an abyss at the hub of the Hegelian system. Derrida's work on Hegel, Glas, which is concerned with Hegel's philosophy, highlights the remarkable resemblance between Hegel's dialectic and Freud's psychoanalysis. Derrida's argument draws a comparison between the Hegelian concept of Aufhebung and Freud's repression. This comparative study aims at showing that no systematic thinking or analysis can release itself from an indigestible and paradoxical element that constitutes the abyss of the systematic or analytical thinking. The first part of the article shows how Derrida, inspired by Kant, thinks of the abyss of the system as the quasi-transcendental that, in a paradoxical way, makes philosophical system both possible and impossible. Concentrating on the concept of repression, the second part delineates similarities of the dialectic and psychoanalysis. In Hegel's view, there is nothing out of cognition; however, Hegel's obsession with Antigone's tragedy reveals that there are dark sides remained outside of the Hegelian system. The last section deals with these remains in Hegel's account of Antigone. Such abyssal points assert that there is a sort of resistance to psychoanalysis, or the process of analysis in general, which deconstruction has always attempted to make us more sensitive to it. © 2014, Mediterranean Center of Social and Educational Research. All rights reserved.
Publication Date: 2014
Theory of Computing Systems (14330490)55(1)pp. 1-40
Justification logics are a family of modal epistemic logics which enables us to reasoning about justifications and evidences. In this paper, we introduce evidence-based multi-agent distributed knowledge logics, called distributed knowledge justification logics. The language of our justification logics contain evidence-based knowledge operators for individual agents and for distributed knowledge, which are interpreted respectively as "t is a justification that agent i accepts for F", and "t is a justification that all agents accept for F if they combine their knowledge and justifications". We study basic properties of our logics and prove the conservativity of distributed knowledge justification logics over multi-agent justification logics. We present Kripke style models, pseudo-Fitting and Fitting models, as well as Mkrtychev models (single world Fitting models) and prove soundness and completeness theorems. We also find a class of Fitting models which satisfies the principle of full communication. Finally, we establish the realization theorem, which states that distributed knowledge justification logics can be embedded into the modal distributed knowledge logics, and vise versa. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
Publication Date: 2016
Logic Journal of the IGPL (13689894)24(5)pp. 743-773
Justification logies provide a framework for reasoning about justifications and evidence. In this article, we study a fuzzy variant of justification logics in which an agent's justification for a belief has certainty degree between 0 and 1. We replace the classical base of justification logics with Hájek's rational Pavelka logic. We introduce fuzzy possible world semantics with crisp accessibility relation and also single world models for our logics. We establish soundness and graded-style completeness for both kinds of semantics. We also introduce extensions with product conjunction. Finally, we offer a solution to a variant of the sorites paradox in our fuzzy justification logics. © The Author 2016.
Publication Date: 2017
European Journal of Philosophy (09668373)25(4)pp. 1327-1339
According to many philosophers, the notion of belief is constitutively normative (Boghossian (,); Shah (,); Shah and Velleman (); Gibbard (); Wedgwood (,)). In a series of widely discussed papers (,), Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have developed an ingenious ‘Moral Twin Earth’ argument against ‘Cornell Realist’ metaethical views which hold that moral terms have synthetic natural definitions in the manner of natural kind terms. In this paper we shall suggest that an adaptation of the Moral Twin Earth argument to the doxastic case – Doxastic Twin Earth – provides new evidence for the normativity of belief. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
